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Abstract
The Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT) is purported to test our inclination to overcome
impulsive, intuitive thought with effortful, rational reflection. Research suggests that
philosophers tend to perform better on this test than non-philosophers, and that men
tend to perform better than women. Taken together, these findings could be interpreted
as partially explaining the gender gap that exists in Philosophy: there are fewer women
in Philosophy because women are less likely to possess the ideal ‘philosophical per-
sonality’. If this explanation for the gender gap in Philosophy is accepted, it might be
seen to exonerate Philosophy departments of the need to put in place much-needed
strategies for promoting gender diversity. This paper discusses a number of reasons for
thinking that this would be the wrong conclusion to draw from the research. Firstly, the
CRT may not track what it is claimed it tracks. Secondly, the trait tracked by the CRT
may not be something that we should value in philosophers. Thirdly, even if we accept
that the CRT tracks a trait that has value, this trait might be of limited importance to
good philosophising. Lastly, the causal story linking the gender gap in CRT score and
the gender gap in Philosophy is likely to be far more complex than this explanation
implies.
Keywords Philosophical methods · Rationality · Women · Gender · Cognition ·
Intuition
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1 Introduction
The Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT) is purported to test our inclination to overcome
impulsive, intuitive thought with effortful, rational reflection. Research suggests that
philosophers tend to perform better on this test than non-philosophers, and that men
tend to perform better than women. Taken together, these findings could be interpreted
as partially explaining the gender gap that exists in Philosophy: there are fewer women
in Philosophy because women are less likely to possess this aspect of the ideal philo-
sophical personality. If this explanation for the gender gap in Philosophy is accepted,
it might be seen to exonerate Philosophy departments of the need to put in place much-
needed strategies for promoting gender diversity. This paper discusses a number of
reasons for thinking that this would be the wrong conclusion to draw from the research.
Firstly, the CRT may not track what it is claimed it tracks. The dominant interpretation
of the CRT is that it tracks an aspect of rationality, but it may be that the CRT tracks
numeracy or confidence instead. Secondly, the trait tracked by the CRT may not be
something we should value in philosophers. Even if we currently select for this trait
in Philosophy, it may be that this trait is not, in fact, an asset to good philosophising.
Thirdly, even if we accept that the CRT tracks a trait that has value, this trait might
be of limited importance to good philosophising. A whole range of virtues and skills
can plausibly be postulated as part of the ideal philosophical personality, and it is not
clear to what extent the trait tracked by the CRT is an important philosophical virtue
or skill. Lastly, the causal story linking the gender gap in CRT score and the gender
gap in Philosophy is likely to be far more complex than this explanation implies. If
the CRT gender gap is explanatory for the Philosophy gender gap, it is likely that it
will be one of several, interacting causal factors.
The research at present does not allow us to draw clear conclusions over which
route (or combination of routes) we should take in response to the findings. However,
one response is clear. Even if it is the case that the CRT gender gap is somewhat
explanatory of the Philosophy gender gap, and even if it is right that the CRT tracks a
trait that is conducive to good philosophising, this does not justify inaction on the part
of Philosophy departments or wider society. Rather, it points to the need for a self-
conscious analysis of the discipline, including looking at what other obstacles there
may be to women’s participation in Philosophy. Additionally, since gender differences
in CRT score are likely to be (at least partly) the result of environmental factors, it
points towards the need for action aimed at rectifying injustices in wider society, so
that women can develop their skills at whatever it is that the CRT tracks.
2 The Cognitive Reflection Test
In 2005, Shane Frederick proposed the CRT as a measure of one type of cognitive
ability. A participant’s CRT score is the number of questions that he or she answers
correctly on the following, three-item test:
1. A bat and a ball cost $1.10 in total. The bat costs $1.00 more than the ball. How
much does the ball cost? Answer: ___ cents.
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2. If it takes 5 machines 5 min to make 5 widgets, how long would it take 100
machines to make 100 widgets? Answer: ___ minutes.
3. In a lake, there is a patch of lily pads. Every day, the patch doubles in size. If it
takes 48 days for the patch to cover the entire lake, how long would it take for the
patch to cover half of the lake? Answer: ___ days.
The test questions have been chosen because they invite an intuitive, wrong answer.
For example, consider the first question. The answer ‘10 cents’ springs to mind, but
this “impulsive” answer is incorrect (Frederick 2005, p. 26). Further reflection on the
problem leads one to realise that the difference between $1.00 and 10 cents is only
90 cents, not $1.00, and “catching that error is tantamount to solving the problem,
since nearly everyone who does not respond “10 cents” does, in fact, give the correct
response: “5 cents.”” (Frederick 2005, p. 27)
In his original paper, Frederick discusses how CRT score is positively and signif-
icantly correlated with various other measures of cognitive ability (for example, the
Wonderlic Personnel Test and the Scholastic Achievement Test). However, he argues
that the CRT tests something distinctive—“cognitive reflection”—which he defines
as “the ability or disposition to resist reporting the response that first comes to mind”
(Frederick 2005, p. 35).
Frederick links performance on the CRT with the distinction between two types
of cognitive processing, referred to by Stanovich and West (2000) as “System 1” and
“System 2”. Nobel Prize winner Daniel Kahneman has brought this dual-process model
of decision-making (as well as the CRT itself) to the attention of the public through
his internationally bestselling Thinking, Fast and Slow.1 System 1 operates quickly
and automatically, with little effort and no sense of voluntary control (Kahneman
2011, p. 20). It is what gives us the immediate, wrong answers to the CRT questions.
System 2 involves slower, more deliberate and effortful thinking (2011, p. 13). It has
a “supervisory function” (2011, p. 48), monitoring and controlling the thoughts and
actions being ‘suggested’ by System 1 (2011, p. 44). Thus, if System 2 is activated in
response to a CRT question, it can override System 1 to give the right answer.
Kahneman cautions us against interpreting ‘systems’ too literally: the terms do not
describe two parts of the brain enacting distinct functions (2011, p. 29). Writing with
Frederick, he clarifies that:
[The terms System 1 and System 2] may suggest the image of autonomous
homunculi, but such a meaning is not intended. We use systems as a label for
collections of processes that are distinguished by their speed, controllability, and
the contents on which they operate. (Kahneman and Frederick 2002, p. 51)
Different test scores on the CRT are said to indicate individual differences in the way
this dual-system functions. Performing poorly on the test indicates a “lazy” System
2 that relies on System 1 to do the work (2011, p. 48). In Kahneman’s words, these
individuals are “impulsive, impatient, and keen to receive immediate gratification”
1 Dual-process models come in various flavours, but all distinguish between cognitive operations that are
quick and associative and those that are slow and rule-governed (Kahneman and Frederick 2002, p. 51). For
an overview of dual-processing accounts, see Evans (2008). Though this model has dominated cognitive
style research over the last 50 years, we should note that it has also been the subject of criticism (e.g. van
Mulukom 2018; Wang et al. 2017; Keren and Schul 2009).
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(2011, p. 48). In contrast, avoiding the intuitive incorrect answer indicates a “more
active” mind (2011, p. 45). These individuals are more likely to invest the effort
required to check their intuitions in other circumstances, and more likely to defer
gratification (2011, p. 48).
The CRT has since become a “tremendously influential measure of reflective think-
ing” (Thomson and Oppenheimer 2016, p. 107) and has been utilised in dozens of
research studies. At the time of writing, Frederick’s paper has been cited 2835 times
(Google Scholar, 5 October 2018). The dominant view remains that the CRT measures
something unique (Szaszi et al. 2017, p. 207), marking it out from other cognitive tests.
For example, Toplak et al. (2011, p. 1275) concluded that “the CRT was a unique
predictor of performance on heuristics-and-biases tasks” and that it tracks “miserly
processing” in a way no other test does. The quest for identifying correlations between
CRT scores and other individual differences has continued until the present day.2
2.1 Interpreting the CRT
The standard interpretation of the CRT has been that it tracks ‘reflectivity’, understood
as an inclination to stop and reflect on one’s intuitions. In his original paper, Frederick
gives a number of reasons to support this, including that many of the participants who
gave right answers had scribbles in the margin or gave verbal reports indicating that
the wrong, intuitive answer was considered first (Frederick 2005, p. 27).
However, some recent studies have questioned this standard interpretation. It makes
sense to assume that ‘stopping and reflecting’ will take additional time, yet Stupple
et al. (2017) found only a weak correlation between CRT response times and accuracy.
In their ‘thinking aloud’ study, Szaszi et al. (2017) found that a significant proportion
(77%) of ‘Correct Answer’ respondents started their thought process with a ‘Correct
Start’ thinking lead (as opposed to the wrong intuition being reflected upon and cor-
rected). Moreover, 39% of ‘Wrong Answer’ respondents did attempt to reflect on their
answers. Perhaps these latter participants suffered not from a lack of reflectivity, but
from a ‘mindware problem’:
individuals lack the declarative knowledge and strategic rules that are needed
to solve some problems. Consequently, even when individuals put considerable
mental effort into the problem-solving process, the lack of this necessary knowl-
edge can lead to thinking failures. (Szaszi et al. 2017, p. 223)
These studies raise important doubts over the standard interpretation of what the CRT
tracks, and this should be kept in mind in the discussion that follows (especially
Sect. 6.1.1). However, these studies are far from conclusive. Jimenez et al. (2018) also
tested response times and got the reverse conclusion to Stupple et al. (2018): “impulsive
subjects complete the test quicker than reflective subjects” (Jimenez et al. 2018, p. 41).
Szaszi et al.’s study was a ‘thinking aloud’ study, relying on participant self-reports of
2 To give just a few examples, correlations have been found between CRT performance and time and risk-
preferences (Frederick 2005, p. 36), likelihood of voting Leave or Remain in the British EU referendum
(House 51), utilitarian moral judgement (Paxton et al. 2012; Baron et al. 2015), belief in the supernatural
(Gervais and Norenzayan 2012) and paranormal beliefs, conspiracy beliefs, and conspiracy mentality (Stahl
and van Prooijenb 2018).
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the thought process, which may be incomplete. Their data can be explained in ways
that are consistent with the standard interpretation. For example, the ‘Correct Start’
participants may have considered the intuitive, wrong answer but never voiced this.3
3 The CRT and gender
Frederick’s original study indicated a significant gender gap in CRT score. The average
score for men was 1.47 and for women was 1.03 (out of a maximum score of 3). The
significance of group difference was calculated as p < 0.0001 (Frederick 2005, p. 38).
Frederick suggests that the test maps “something that men have more of” and concludes
that “men are more likely to reflect on their answers and less inclined to go with their
intuitive responses” (2005, p. 37).
The finding that there is a gender gap in CRT score has been reliably replicated ever
since (e.g. Szaszi et al. 2017, p. 216; Zhang et al. 2016; Thomson and Oppenheimer
2016, p. 106; Livengood et al. 2010), including in studies with participants from
different age groups, educational levels and countries, and using the original CRT as
well as some modified versions (Primi et al. 2018, p. 259). For example, a 2016 study
gave typical results when it found that women are more likely than men to answer
all three questions incorrectly and that the average CRT score of men is significantly
higher than women (1.12 vs. 0.58, p < 0.001) (Cueva et al. 2016, p. 82). One 2017 study
reported that “males scored 83.8% higher on the CRT” than females (Agnew 2017,
p. 8). In their meta-analysis of 118 CRT studies (comprising of 44,558 participants
across 21 countries), Brañas-Garza et al. (2015) found a negative correlation between
being female and giving correct answers to the CRT test questions. Amongst ‘Wrong
Answer’ respondents, women are more likely than men to give the intuitive response
(e.g. Frederick 2005; Cueva et al. 2016; Pennycook et al. 2016).
4 The CRT and Philosophy
The research on the gender gap in CRT score makes for some rather uncomfortable
reading, especially in light of the association of the CRT with an aspect of rationality.
It appears to support the stereotype that women are more guided by intuition than
rationality. On the face of it, it lends credibility to the view that “rationality is mas-
culine”, a view that forms “a backdrop to common Western conceptions of gender
difference that have a deep influence on everyday life” (Haslanger 2012, p. 47).
These feelings of discomfort escalate when we pair these findings with a look at
how CRT scoring has been used in some recent research in experimental philosophy.
In a study involving data on 4472 participants, Livengood et al. (2010) investigated
the relationship between philosophical training and CRT score. They found that the
mean CRT score for participants with some training in Philosophy (0.98) was more
than double the mean CRT score for participants with no training in Philosophy (0.44).
Further, the mean CRT score for participants with some graduate training in Philos-
3 See Szaszi et al. (2017, pp. 225–226) for a discussion of the limitations of their study, some of which also
apply to the Stupple et al. study.
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ophy (1.32) was triple the mean CRT score for those with no training in Philosophy
(Livengood et al. 2010, p. 316).
Those with more training in Philosophy tend to be better educated than those with no
training in Philosophy, and so Livengood et al. sought to isolate ‘training in Philosophy’
as a factor. They found that even when controlling for relevant factors such as levels of
education and gender, people with more philosophical training tend to exhibit higher
CRT scores.4 For example, out of those participants who reported having had some
college education, the mean CRT score of those who had taken some Philosophy
courses was nearly 70% higher than that of those who had not taken Philosophy
courses (Livengood et al. 2010, p. 316).
The authors comment that their data suggests that there are some “deep commonal-
ities” among philosophers. They hypothesise that philosophers share a “philosophical
temperament”—a “cluster of dispositions that distinguishes philosophy from other
intellectual endeavours” (Livengood et al. 2010, p. 318). Livengood et al. do not sug-
gest what other dispositions might make up this ‘philosophical temperament’, instead
focusing their discussion entirely on the “single, but important aspect of philosophical
temperament” that they suppose is tracked by the CRT (2010, p. 318). This aspect is
“cognitive reflectivity”, understood as “a disposition to challenge one’s own intuitions
whenever presented with a novel problem, rather than simply relying on whatever
first comes to mind” (2010, p. 314). They suggest that “philosophers are less likely
to blindly accept their intuitions and more likely to submit those intuitions to scruti-
ny” (2010, p. 319). They conclude that their data suggests that this reflectivity is “an
important facet of philosophical personality” (2010, p. 314).
More recently, Justin Sytsma (2016) has used CRT scoring to hypothesise that
religious philosophers are “less analytic”, perhaps explaining the alleged “poor health”
of the sub-discipline of Philosophy of Religion. Sytsma implies that the CRT tracks
what type of ‘thinking style’ you have (“analytic” versus “intuitive”) and speculates
that this might correlate with an ability to evaluate arguments. Putting his controversial
hypotheses to one side, we can note that there are two assumptions at work here. Firstly,
the CRT tracks analyticity (understood as a propensity to think analytically as opposed
to intuitively). Secondly, possessing the feature tracked by the CRT contributes to
‘healthy’ philosophising. Both of these assumptions will be questioned in this paper.
4.1 Criticism of the idea of a ‘philosophical personality’
The view taken by Livengood et al.—that philosophers are in some sense ‘expert-
intuiters’—is a version of what has become known as the ‘expertise defence’.5 Whilst
4 This finding has been replicated by Byrd (2014, p. 31), who found that “training and selection in philosophy
resulted in better performance on the CRT”.
5 It is a ‘defence’ because it has usually been discussed as a response to “the restrictionist challenge”
(Alexander and Weinberg 2007), which says that since the findings of experimental philosophers call into
question the truth-tracking features of many philosophically relevant intuitions (Feltz and Cokeley 2012),
the current reliance on intuitions in Philosophy should be radically restricted. Roughly, the expertise defence
replies that since philosophers are experts, their intuitions are not subject to the sorts of distortions that
have been seen in experiments with non-philosophers, and therefore can be trusted for use in philosophical
theorising. Rini (2015, p. 434) discusses two versions of the expertise defence: one that says that philosophers
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some have seen philosophical expertise as lying in having better intuitions, Livengood
et al.’s understanding seems to be that philosophers possess a special trait enabling
them to overcome biases of judgement and to reflect appropriately on intuitions. They
talk about it being part of “expert philosophizing” to employ “intuition-poking prac-
tices” (2010, p. 319), “a range of possible practices, which all have in common that
they are meant to determine whether the intuition is trustworthy and should thus be
endorsed” (2010, p. 318). Philosophers are “more reflective than their peers: they are
less likely than their peers to embrace what seems obvious without questioning it,
and they are disposed to submit to scrutiny their intuitive inclination to judge that
something is the case” (2010, p. 314).
Recently, a number of empirical studies have led to the expertise defence coming
under scrutiny (Tobia et al. 2013; Schulz et al. 2011; Horvath and Wiegmann 2016).
Notably, Schwitzgebel and Cushman (2012)’s research suggests that philosophers are
as easily trapped by unreflective intuitions as non-philosophers. Earlier studies had
found that how people judge a hypothetical moral scenario is affected by the order in
which these scenarios are presented. That is, moral judgements are subject to ‘order
effects’. Since order of presentation is a factor that seems irrelevant to the rightness or
wrongness of a scenario, we would hope that philosophers would be protected against
this source of bias. Yet Schwitzgebel and Cushman found that philosophers judging
moral scenarios were also subject to these order effects. Moreover, the order in which
scenarios were presented substantially influenced which general moral principles the
philosophers then endorsed. Contra Livengood et al., this suggests that there is no
distinctive personality trait of ‘reflectivity’ that gives philosophers a special ability to
overcome biases of judgement.
It might be thought that these new findings prevent the idea of a ‘philosophical
personality’ from getting off the ground. However, there are a number of ways of
explaining Schwitzgebel and Cushman’s results that leave the expertise defence intact
(Rini 2015). For example, it might be that Schwitzgebel and Cushman get the results
that they do for philosophers because they are forcing them to make a binary choice on a
question which the philosopher believes does not have a clear ‘yes’ or ‘no’ answer. This
is supported by Bourget and Chalmers’s (2014) study of professional philosophers,
which indicated that philosophers are disinclined to make binary judgements on moral
principles similar to those asked for in Schwitzgebel and Cushman’s study. Forcing
a binary judgement in response to a moral scenario or principle already identified by
philosophers as problematic is therefore unlikely to reveal much about ordinary philo-
sophical practice (and correspondingly, about what philosophical expertise consists
in), since ordinary philosophical practice seems to involve refraining from forming
these judgments (Rini 2015, p. 445). Thus it might still be the case that philosophers,
when acting qua philosophers (engaged in their ordinary philosophical practice), are
Footnote 5 continued
simply have better intuitions than non-philosophers, and one that says that philosophers make better use
of their intuitions. Note that both of these are different from how I formulate the defence here. I try to do
so in a way that is consistent with the strong performance of philosophers on the CRT, which seems to
be about simply discarding intuitions, rather than starting off with correct intuitions or making good use
of our intuitions. For defences of philosophical expertise, see Singer (1972), Ludwig (2007), Grundmann
(2010), Williamson (2007) and Williamson (2011). For a theoretical challenge to the expertise defence, see
Weinberg et al. (2010).
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particularly careful when drawing conclusions based on certain intuitions, and here
lies an element of their expertise.
More recently, Droz˙dz˙owicz (2018) has argued that even in light of the empirical
studies, there remains room for a task-based version of the expertise defence, where
philosophical expertise lies in (i) devising and discussing arguments, (ii) proposing,
modifying, and refuting theories, and (iii) articulating and applying distinctions. She
actually cites the Livengood et al. study as an example of one potentially fruitful way of
testing whether philosophers have this kind of expertise. If philosophers have “exten-
sive training in argumentation”, which plausibly involves “evaluating one’s intuitions
as premises and blocking them, if needed, then it could perhaps be hypothesized that
philosophers will score better in the CRT than non-philosophers…” (Droz˙dz˙owicz
2018, p. 268). Since this is precisely what was found in Livengood et al.’s study, the
idea that such a disposition might be part of the philosophical personality remains
somewhat plausible.
5 How do these findings bear on the under-representation of women
in Philosophy?
The empirical research on the CRT and its relation to gender and Philosophy appears
to be telling us two things: Women tend to perform worse on the CRT than men,
and philosophers tend to perform better than non-philosophers. These purported
facts could be interpreted as shedding light on a further fact: women are under-
represented in Philosophy.6 Whilst most career paths and subject areas have seen
a steady increase in women’s participation, often to the point of equal representation
or over-representation, there remains a lack of gender parity in Philosophy, comparable
to the under-representation of women in ‘STEM’ subjects (Science, Technology, Engi-
neering and Mathematics). A steady decline (often referred to as a ‘leaky pipeline’)
can be seen in women’s participation in Philosophy as we move ‘up the stages’. For
example, in the UK, a drop was seen from 46% at undergraduate level, through to
31% at PhD level, to 24% of permanent staff and 19% of professors (Beebee and
Saul 2011). In the US, women make up about 30% of those earning Philosophy PhDs,
far less than the average for all disciplines (Figdor and Drabek 2016). According to
the Survey of Earned Doctorates in the US in 2009, Engineering, Computer Science
and Physics are the only subjects where women earn fewer PhDs than in Philosophy
(Healy 2011). Women are also poorly represented in the highest-ranked Philosophy
journals, even when compared to the number of women working in elite universities.
Sally Haslanger’s survey of seven top Philosophy journals from 2002 to 2007 found
that 12.4% of all authors were women (Haslanger 2008).
Greeted with these three streams of research (on the CRT and gender, on the CRT
and Philosophy, and on the Philosophy gender gap), one might be tempted to propose
something like the following: Perhaps women are less likely to possess the aspect of
the ideal philosophical personality that is tracked by the CRT, and this contributes to
6 There is a growing literature documenting this trend. For detailed discussions, see Beebee and Saul (2011),
Figdor and Drabek (2016) and Thompson (2017).
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the gender gap in Philosophy.7 If this is right, then it might be thought that the current
trend towards encouraging Philosophy departments to engage in affirmative action
strategies is misguided.8 Since this is a natural (perhaps ‘intuitive’) response to the
research, I call this the ‘Quick Conclusion’.
Quick Conclusion: The CRT tracks something valuable in Philosophy – an aspect
of the ideal philosophical personality – which women tend to lack. The gender
gap in the CRT is therefore explanatory for the gender gap in Philosophy. Phi-
losophy departments and wider society are therefore exonerated of the need to
institute or maintain practices intended to decrease the gender gap in Philosophy.
Many readers will find this a highly unpalatable explanation for the gender gap in
Philosophy. At its most crude, this view suggests that there are fewer female philoso-
phers because women are less rational. Livengood et al. and Sytsma do not draw this
conclusion (in fact, they do not discuss the implications of their findings for women
and Philosophy). But there is a risk that others who encounter these findings will do,
for it is hard to deny that this kind of explanation for the gender gap has at least some
prima facie plausibility.
First, it is suggested by the ideas presented above: the important role that intuitions
play in philosophical practice, the dominance of intuitions in discussions of philosoph-
ical expertise, and the CRT as a particularly potent measure of how people tend to
respond to intuitions.9 As has been discussed, high CRT score is said to indicate a pre-
disposition to careful reflection rather than reliance on intuitions. Some see intuitions
as the “raw data” of Philosophy, with the role of the philosopher being to rigorously
analyse these intuitions (Hutchison 2013, p. 112). Kahneman talks of System 2 as
sometimes acting as an “apologist” for the automatic responses provided by System
1 (2011, p. 103). Thus we might see the practice of Philosophy as hyper-exercise of
System 2, in order to scrutinise, justify and in some cases, override the intuitions pro-
vided by System 1. If women are more inclined to simply go with the first intuition
7 Someone pushing a philosophical personality explanation of the gender gap would need to propose other
aspects of the philosophical personality that women supposedly lack—perhaps an ability to withstand
harsh criticism and aggressive questioning (Beebee 2013) or a propensity to enjoy topics that do not appear
practically useful or relevant to one’s life (Thompson et al. 2016). Following Livengood et al. (2010), my
focus throughout this paper is solely on the one aspect of the philosophical personality apparently tracked
by the CRT. There are a number of reasons for this. First and foremost, it is because the fundamental
question of this paper arose when I encountered three apparent facts—the low CRT score amongst women,
the high CRT score amongst philosophers, and the low representation of women in Philosophy—and had
the ‘Quick Conclusion’ offered by my interlocutors in response to these facts. Thus the paper’s main aim is
to make sense of this combination of facts together. Second, the idea that a special skill relating to intuitions
is central to good philosophical practice has prima facie plausibility and has been a dominant position in
Philosophy, evidenced by the wide amount of discussion of the role of intuitions in Philosophy and of the
idea that philosophers are ‘expert-intuiters’. Third, there is a general consensus that this skill is particularly
well-tracked by the CRT, and there is a vast amount of evidence, interest and literature surrounding the CRT
to draw on, including in the experimental philosophy and philosophical methodology literature. Thanks to
an anonymous reviewer for Synthese for pressing me on this issue.
8 For examples of this trend, see APA (2017), BPA/SWIP (2011), and Hassoun (2017).
9 On the important role that intuitions play in Philosophy, as well as the debates surrounding this question,
see Feltz and Cokeley (2012, pp. 229–231), Pinillos et al. (2011, p. 116) and Sosa (2009). In opposition to
this dominant view, see Cappelen (2012), who argues that it is not characteristic of philosophers to rely on
intuitions as evidence.
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that pops into their heads rather than employing System 2 processes, then perhaps this
amounts to being less inclined to philosophical thinking.
Second, appeals to a cognitive gap—to a cognitive trait that women tend to have less
of than men and which arguably has an important role in philosophical practice—have
some explanatory merit over other explanations that have dominated the literature on
the gender gap, such as stereotype threat and implicit bias.10 These other explanations
require generalising from research conducted in other fields or in the laboratory, and it
is not yet clear to what extent it is legitimate to extrapolate to Philosophy. According
to a recent review of the research into stereotype threat and implicit bias “there is little
empirical evidence of their effects within Philosophy” (Thompson 2017, p. 5). It also
remains unclear why these mechanisms would have had more of an effect on women in
the field of Philosophy than in other disciplines. In contrast, appealing to a cognitive
gap helps to explain the distinctive situation of Philosophy. Indeed, it fits with the
finding by Livengood et al. that the opposite pattern can be found in Psychology (a
field where women are significantly over-represented): those with more psychological
training tend to exhibit lower CRT scores (2010, p. 328, n. 10). Livengood et al.
do not attempt to explain this finding, nor do they report data for other disciplines.
However, a defender of the Quick Conclusion might hypothesise that whilst women
trickled into Psychology as the negative effects of discrimination and stereotype threat
were gradually overcome, a matching trend did not happen in Philosophy because
additional obstacles were (and remain) present. One such additional obstacle might
be that women tend to lack an important aspect of the personality required to engage
properly in philosophical practice.
Moreover, the research by Livengood et al. removes one obstacle to pursuing cog-
nitive gap explanations for the under-representation of women in Philosophy. It has
been argued by Thompson (2017, p. 3; 10, n.5) and Lemoine (2017) that it is not
worth pursuing cognitive gap explanations for the gender gap in Philosophy because
we do not know which cognitive abilities are correlated with philosophical aptitude.
But since the research by Livengood et al. suggests one such correlation, this particular
obstacle to pursuing cognitive gap explanations is now removed.
If this explanation for the gender gap in Philosophy is accepted, it might be seen to
exonerate Philosophy departments of the need to put in place much-needed strategies
for promoting gender diversity. If women are simply not up to doing Philosophy, there
is little point in investing time and effort into making Philosophy departments more
hospitable places for women. My view is that this would be the wrong response to the
empirical research, since there are many plausible interpretations of the findings that
avoid this implication. In the remainder of this paper, I show how thoughtful reflection
on the research points against the Quick Conclusion, towards other interpretations that
would necessitate different practical responses.
In order to properly assess the Quick Conclusion, it will be helpful to disaggregate
it into several different claims that are at stake. To begin with, we can note that talk
10 For discussions of the impact of stereotype threat and implicit bias in Philosophy, see Beebee (2013),
Beebee and Saul (2011), Goguen (2016) and Saul (2013). For criticism of appeals to stereotype threat and
implicit bias, see Hermanson (2017). In support of the possibility that a cognitive gap might explain some
gender and race differences, see Summers (2005) and Winegard et al. (2017).
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of the ‘ideal philosophical personality’ and a trait being ‘valuable in Philosophy’ is
ambiguous, allowing for either a descriptive or normative interpretation:
Descriptive Ideal Philosophical Personality Hypothesis (IPPD): The CRT tracks
something that is currently valued within the discipline of Philosophy—an aspect
of what is (consciously or unconsciously) viewed as part of the ‘ideal philo-
sophical personality’—which women tend to lack. The gender gap in the CRT
is therefore explanatory for the gender gap in Philosophy.11
Normative Ideal Philosophical Personality Hypothesis (IPPN): The CRT tracks
something that (as a matter of fact) is a valuable philosophical trait – an aspect
of the ideal philosophical personality – which women tend to lack. The gender
gap in the CRT is therefore explanatory for the gender gap in Philosophy.
Even if both of these claims were true, it would not necessarily result in the following,
action-guiding claim that is part of the Quick Conclusion:
Inaction Conclusion: Philosophy departments and wider society are exonerated
of the need to institute or maintain practices intended to decrease the gender gap
in Philosophy.
In what follows, I will give reasons to question all three of these claims. However,
the only claim that we can dismiss with confidence is the Inaction Conclusion. As I
will discuss below, neither IPPD nor IPPN entails the Inaction Conclusion. It is worth
at the outset pointing to one reason why this is so: the gender gap in CRT may be
caused by environmental factors (as opposed to it being part of the ‘female nature’
that there is a tendency to exhibit less of the trait(s) tracked by the CRT). If this is
the case, then action is still required. This would primarily need to take place outside
Philosophy departments, in wider society, in order to rectify widespread, far-reaching
structural injustices that result in women’s poorer performance at this cognitive skill.
The reason that changes within Philosophy capture more of my attention in what
follows is simply that as philosophers, there is more that we can do to make an impact
within the discipline than we can in society as a whole.
6 Responses
6.1 Does the CRT track what it is claimed to track?
The CRT has been seen as an indicator of rationality (Stanovich 2011; Toplak et al.
2011, p. 1283), reflectivity (Livengood et al. 2010; Szaszi et al. 2017, p. 208) and
11 The ‘ideal philosophical personality’ in the sense of IPPD is somewhat similar to the idea of the “philo-
sophical personality” discussed by Peña-Guzmán and Spera (2017). They see the “philosophical personality”
as “the profile of the contemporary philosopher that emerges from the organization and interaction of two
specific forces” (Peña-Guzmán and Spera 2017, p. 911). First, the philosopher as imago—“the figure of
the professional philosopher who has succeeded by the standards established by his field” (2017, p. 914).
Second, the philosopher as idea(l)—the mental representation that philosophers have of ‘the philosopher’.
Since both philosopher as imago and philosopher as idea(l) are dictated by current sociological trends,
neither term captures my normative understanding of the ideal philosophical personality (IPPN).
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analyticity (Sytsma 2016; Stahl and van Prooijenb 2018). These are all traits that have
prima facie plausibility as part of the ideal philosophical personality.12 Yet it is far
from clear whether we can straightforwardly associate CRT performance with these
traits. Two alternative possibilities for what the CRT tracks stand out in the literature:
numeracy and/or confidence.
6.1.1 Numeracy
Numeracy is one’s ability to store, represent and process mathematical operations
(Peters, 2012). It has been widely discussed how difficult it is to disentangle cognitive
reflection from numeracy (Thomson and Oppenheimer 2016, p. 101). All three test
questions involve numbers, lending prima facie plausibility to the suggestion that the
CRT tracks numeracy. There also exists a large body of research suggesting that the
CRT measures both cognitive reflection and numeracy.13
In Frederick’s original study, only one other cognitive test showed a gender differ-
ence—the SAT maths scores (Frederick 2005, p. 37). Frederick comments that “men
generally score higher than women on math tests” and he cites various studies from
the 80s and 90s to support this claim. As I will discuss below, there is now strong
counter-evidence to this. However, some studies do continue to point towards gender
differences in maths ability, particularly as age of participants and complexity of the
test increases (e.g. Ganley and Vasilyevam 2014; Lindberg et al. 2010, p. 1132; Ben-
bow et al. 2000). Primi et al. (2018, pp. 261–262) suggest that the strongest available
evidence for gender differences in maths performance comes from the Programme for
International Student Assessment (PISA), which assesses the competencies of 15 year
old students from 65 countries in various subjects, including Mathematics. On average
across OECD countries, boys outperform girls in Mathematics by eight score points.
The difference is most notable amongst the highest achieving students: the highest-
scoring 10% of boys score 16 points higher than the best-performing 10% of girls
(OECD 2016, p. 196).14
If there is a numeracy gender gap, it seems plausible that this might be explanatory
for the CRT gender gap. This explanation is supported by research by Thomson and
Oppenheimer (2016). They piloted the ‘CRT-2’, a test designed to measure cognitive
reflection whilst avoiding conflation with numeracy. The CRT-2 uses “trick questions”
that “do not require a high degree of mathematical sophistication” (2016, p. 101).15 200
participants were tested on both the CRT and the CRT-2 and it was found that the gender
gap significantly lessened on the CRT-2. Whilst men (M65.9% correct) significantly
12 When I refer to the ‘ideal philosophical personality’ or the ‘Ideal Philosophical Personality Hypothesis’
without making specific reference to IPPD or IPPN, my comment applies to both versions.
13 In the studies listed by Thomson and Oppenheimer (2016, p. 101) to support this point, correlations
between the CRT and numeracy ranged from 0.31 to 0.51. More recently, Szaszi et al. (2017, p. 207) have
argued that “the CRT is a multi-faceted construct: both numeracy and reflectivity account for performance”.
14 The mean score for Mathematics across all countries was 490 (OECD 2016). About two-thirds of all
students across OECD countries score between 400 and 600 points (OECD 2018).
15 Here is one question from the test: “Emily’s father has three daughters. The first two are named April
and May. What is the third daughter’s name? (intuitive answer: June; correct answer: Emily)” (Thomson
and Oppenheimer 2016, p. 101).
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outperformed women (M36.0% correct) on the original CRT (p < 0.001), men (M
60.5% correct) and women (M53.3% correct) were not reliably different on the CRT-
2 (p > 0.05) (Thomson and Oppenheimer 2011, pp. 106–107). This finding is consistent
with differences in numeracy being a cause of the gender gap on the original CRT.
This explanation is further supported by a recent study by Primi et al. (2018), which
found that the direct effect of gender was no longer statistically significant once the
variables of mathematical reasoning and maths anxiety were taken into account. Addi-
tionally, Szaszi et al. (2017) suggest that we simply cannot separate numeracy from
reflectivity on the CRT, since good numeracy is likely to deliver you the right intu-
itions from the start. Indeed, it is notable from reading their examples of participants’
vocalised thought processes that ‘Correct Answer’ respondents often recognised that
there was an equation that needs solving in the bat and ball question (Szaszi et al.
2017, p. 218).
The research at present does not, however, lead us to a position where we can
say that gender differences in the CRT can be entirely explained via gender differ-
ences in numeracy. Firstly, we should note that Thomson and Oppenheimer’s CRT-2
has not gained popularity, nor is it agreed whether it tests the cognitive skill that
behavioural economists and psychologists have become so interested in. As Primi
et al. (2018, p. 274) point out, the correlations between the CRT-2 and various mea-
sures of rational thinking and decision-making skills were generally weaker than the
correlations between these measures and the original CRT. Secondly, other studies,
including Frederick’s original study, claim to have controlled for numeracy and yet
found that a significant gender gap remains (Frederick 2005, p. 37; Agnew 2017, p. 12).
Thirdly, it is far from clear to what extent there is, in fact, a gender numeracy gap.
In their meta-analysis of 242 studies published between 1990 and 2007, representing
the testing of 1286,350 people, Lindberg et al. (2010, p. 1131) conclude that “there is
no longer a gender difference in mathematics performance”. This is consistent with
Hyde et al.’s (2008) study, which (using data from over seven million students) found
no evidence of gender differences on US state math tests among students between
Grade 2 and Grade 11. Where gender differences in favour of males are seen (for
example, in complex problem-solving at high school level), these differences appear
to be attributable to multiple possible environmental explanations (for example, that
parents and teachers give higher ability estimates to boys than girls, and that patterns
of interest are affected by cultural influences) (Lindberg et al. 2010, p. 1132). This
latter possibility would also help explain why gender differences in maths differ across
countries, as well as the fact that these differences correlate with gender inequality
measures for those countries (Else-Quest et al. 2010; Guiso et al. 2008; Penner 2008).
Nevertheless, a consensus does seem to have developed that numeracy is at least
one component in performance on the CRT (Thomson and Oppenheimer 2016, p. 101;
Szaszi et al. 2017, p. 207; Primi et al. 2018). What is the significance of this for
explaining the gender gap in Philosophy?
It might be that the CRT tracks numeracy, and numeracy is required for success
in Philosophy.16 This fits with the high regard that philosophers have historically
16 Talking of ‘success in Philosophy’ is ambiguous. It could refer to staying on in the discipline through
the levels, eventually becoming a professional philosopher with publications and a permanent job. Or, it
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held for mathematics. It may be that maths skills are closely related to philosophical
skills, particularly those required for Logic, which is often a compulsory component
of Philosophy programmes. Evidence suggests that studying advanced mathematics
develops some aspects of conditional reasoning, including the ability to reject invalid
inferences (Inglis and Attridge 2016, p. 130), and so there is good reason to think that
maths skills and logical skills are linked. Some have even argued that mathematical
competence is crucial to good Philosophy. Boghossian and Lindsay (2016) declare that
“If you want to be a good philosopher, don’t rely on intuition or comfort. Study maths
and science.” Their reason is that “Philosophers who can think like mathematicians
are better at clear thinking, and thus philosophy.”
However, evidence supporting this view seems rather sparse. As Thompson (2017,
p. 3) says, the extent to which maths skills are required for success in Philosophy is not
yet clear. Moreover, evidence of good numeracy is rarely, if ever, an entry requirement
for university Philosophy programmes.17
Given the research at present, it is unclear (i) whether women are worse at numer-
acy, (ii) the extent to which the CRT measures numeracy and (iii) whether numeracy
is required for success in Philosophy. We therefore cannot adequately justify the con-
clusion that women’s tendency towards a low CRT score represents low numeracy,
which contributes to their low participation in Philosophy.
6.1.2 Confidence
Some have praised the CRT for being a “performance measure rather than a self-
report measure” (Toplak et al. 2011, p. 1275), but this neglects the important effect
that self-perception of one’s abilities can have on performance. It may be that the CRT
tracks confidence in numerical abilities rather than (or in addition to) actual cognitive
abilities. Zhang et al. (2016, p. 427) found that when differences in quantitative self-
efficacy (perceived fluency with numerical information) are controlled for, gender
differences on the CRT disappear. They conclude that “men perform better on the
CRT because they are more confident in their quantitative abilities” (2016, p. 427).
This is consistent with research on maths anxiety and gender differences, which
has found that females suffer more from maths anxiety than males (Else-Quest et al.
2010; Devine et al. 2012). Ganley and Vasilyevam (2014)’s research suggests that
female’s heightened worry on maths tests utilizes their visuospatial working memory
resources, leading to poorer performance. This would fit with Szaszi et al.’s (2017)
suggestion (discussed in Sect. 2.1) that those answering the CRT questions incorrectly
may be failing to bring to mind the strategic rules needed to solve the questions.
Footnote 16 continued
could refer to producing new, plausible ideas that take us closer to the truth, or inspiring others to engage
thoughtfully in philosophical issues, or some other measure of what it means to be a successful philosopher
that is not dictated by one’s success in the academy. These two kinds of success could, and perhaps sometimes
do, come apart. Where I wish to distinguish between these two kinds of success, I refer to the first kind of
success as ‘successful progression in the field’ and to the second kind of success as ‘good philosophising’.
17 Of course, this does not mean that it is right that maths skills are ignored as a selection criterion
in Philosophy. In the UK, the largest ‘drop-off’ of women tends to happen between undergraduate and
Masters level (BPA 2011, p. 9). One (amongst many) possible explanations of this is that some female
undergraduates find that they are just not ‘up to it’, because of reasons linked with their poorer numeracy.
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It also fits with the wider picture given by research on confidence, which has sug-
gested that women tend to have lower levels of self-confidence than men.18 We might
hypothesise that pursuing Philosophy to higher levels requires a degree of confidence
in one’s abilities that women are less likely to possess. There is at least some prima
facie reason to think that confidence contributes to successful progression within the
field. For example, the level of confidence with which you deliver your question or
paper, or the conviction with which you profess your conclusion, is likely to affect
the way that it is received by others (see Schwitzgebel (2010) on the potential effects
of “being good at seeming smart”). Additionally, effectively ‘batting away’ oppo-
nents requires not just intellect, but an element of performance (Larvor 2015). As
Justin Weinberg (2015) comments, most graduate students in Philosophy are advised
to “project confidence”. Perhaps women’s poorer performance on the CRT tracks their
high anxiety and low confidence, and these traits affect their levels of participation
and performance in Philosophy.
However, a concern with this line of reasoning is that Zhang et al.’s study, like
many others, does not account for the possibility that people’s beliefs about ability
are accurate (Lemoine 2017; Jussim 2012). That is, the self-report measure of quan-
titative self-efficacy may track numeracy, because the people that lack confidence in
their quantitative abilities do so because they are, as a matter of fact, less competent
at numeracy. This is consistent with research by Primi et al. (2018, p. 273), which
found a direct link between maths anxiety and cognitive reflection, but found that the
effect of maths anxiety on cognitive reflection was partially mediated by mathematical
reasoning.
If quantitative self-efficacy is strongly linked with actual mathematical ability, then
we are back to our unanswered question of whether numeracy is relevant to success
in Philosophy.
6.1.3 Implications
The research discussed in this section does not point to clear conclusions about what
the CRT tracks. Nor is it clear what the relevance to explaining the gender gap in
Philosophy would be. However, it does suggest that we should, at the least, be scep-
tical about a straightforward equating of CRT score with rationality, reflectivity or
analyticity. It therefore attacks a version of IPP that suggests that it is a lack of these
particular traits that holds women back in Philosophy.
The discussion so far has not attempted to deny that there may be traits that women
tend to lack which might help explain the gender gap in Philosophy. Rather, it has
explored the possibility that the CRT tracks numeracy or confidence. The absence
of relevant empirical research on the roles that numeracy and confidence play in
Philosophy means that we are unable to say to what extent these attributes are currently
valued in Philosophy and whether they contribute to successful progression in the field
as it stands. There is, however, some anecdotal evidence suggesting that confidence
18 For example, Bleidorn et al. (2016) found that across 48 countries, males consistently reported higher
self-esteem than females. Thompson et al. (2016, p. 9) found that female students taking Philosophy classes
reported feeling less confident in their ability to do well in Philosophy than did men.
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might contribute to successful progression in the field, lending at least some, limited
support to IPPD.
6.2 Is the trait tracked by the CRT something we should value in philosophers?
There is clearly a question mark over what the CRT tracks. But whatever it tracks, this
is something that women tend to have less of than men and philosophers tend to have
in abundance. So, we can raise a second question asking why we should think that the
CRT tracks something that we should value in philosophers. That is, even if IPPD is
true, why should we think that IPPN is true?
The idea that the CRT tracks something we should value in philosophers seems to
be assumed by Livengood et al. When talking of the ‘philosophical personality’, the
authors say that they seek only to describe “who philosophers are” (2010, p. 314). But
at points they slip from this descriptive exercise by implicitly adopting the normative
assumption that they have identified a philosophical virtue. For example, they imply
that what the CRT tracks is part of the expertise of philosophers (2010, pp. 319, 320).
But who philosophers are and who philosophers should be are different questions.
The fact that some norm exists amongst philosophers which correlates with their
good performance on CRTs does not, in itself, tell us that this trait is an asset to
philosophising. Imagine that there was evidence suggesting that philosophers are more
likely to exhibit social awkwardness than non-philosophers. It would be wrong to
conclude from this research that social awkwardness is part of the ideal philosophical
personality (even in the sense of IPPD, for this trait might appear accidentally, rather
than being (consciously or unconsciously) selected for). Rather, this trait is irrelevant
(or even detrimental) to good philosophising.
Similarly, we might generalise from the finding about CRT tracking quantitative
self-efficacy to say that philosophers have a tendency to be more confident about
their cognitive abilities. But again, this attribute does not necessarily make for better
philosophising. The philosophers discussed in the previous section who have offered
anecdotal support for the role of confidence in Philosophy have tended to see this as
a flaw in currently philosophical practice—a mark of a deep methodological problem
with the way that Philosophy currently operates (Larvor 2015). Indeed, one might
even think that those with lower confidence actually make for better philosophers,
because they may be more open to counter-arguments. When evaluating IPPN, the
salient question in assessing the relevance of the CRT should be whether whatever it
tracks is an epistemologically relevant trait, one that we should value as conducive to
the pursuit of knowledge (or whatever we see as the aim of Philosophy).
This idea that certain traits might be dominant in Philosophy without necessarily
being conducive to good philosophising becomes more plausible when we consider the
flaws in the supposedly meritocratic system used to select philosophers (onto courses,
and into posts). It has been well-discussed that meritocratic selection may be subject
to biases at the level of deciding whether a candidate fulfils certain criteria.19 But
19 For an overview of some core studies on bias in appointing for faculty and leadership roles, see Corrice
(2009).
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it may also be that there is bias present in deciding what these criteria are.20 The
‘success criteria’ of what it is to be a good philosopher are (at least partially) decided
by those already successful in the discipline, so that the norms and values of these
individuals are reproduced in those selected, in a kind of feedback loop (Jenkins 2013).
For example, Haslanger (2008, p. 217) and others have expressed concern over the
dominance of a hyper-rational norm in Philosophy, which is often taken to represent
the high-end of the discipline, but which may not necessarily contribute towards good
philosophising.
So, it may be that the CRT tracks trait T, and those possessing T are (intentionally or
unintentionally) more likely to be recruited to Philosophy. But this does not, in itself,
tell us that T is important for good philosophising. This ‘irrelevant trait hypothesis’
resists the move from IPPD to IPPN, as it suggests that although the trait(s) tracked
by the CRT may be part of the philosophical personality, this does not mean that
they are part of the ideal philosophical personality. It suggests that the CRT tracks
a trait that is not relevant to good philosophising, but either (1) just so happens to
be well-represented in philosophers, despite not being selected for (as in the social
awkwardness example) or (2) is unconsciously or consciously selected for because
it is mistakenly thought to be part of the ideal philosophical personality (as in the
confidence and hyper-rationality examples). If this were the case, then we certainly
should not settle for the Inaction Conclusion. Rather, we should seek changes to the
status quo in the discipline, such as re-evaluation of the criteria used when assessing
applicants for Philosophy jobs.
This response has flagged that there is an open question as to whether we should
be valuing whatever it is that the CRT tracks. But there are difficulties with pursuing
this ‘irrelevant trait hypothesis’. Though there may be scope for debate over the pur-
poses and methodology of the discipline, there is also wide agreement that Philosophy
aims at the truth. The person who does badly in the CRT gets the wrong answers, and
philosophers are after right answers. Moreover, as has been discussed, it seems plau-
sible to say that it is part of good philosophising to engage in careful reflection over
one’s intuitions, and to be especially immune to biases of judgement. We therefore
might not want to press too hard with the idea that there is nothing of value in what is
tested by the CRT.
6.3 How important is this trait to good philosophising?
We might concede that the CRT tracks something of value, but argue that it is only
one small part of the cognitive skills that contribute to good philosophising.
Imagine a test used to assess physical fitness for the military that has press-ups as
the key element. Since women tend to have lower levels of arm strength than men,
they might find it harder to pass this test. But it would be wrong to conclude that the
women who fail this test are ‘physically unfit’. Arm strength is just one small part of
20 Studies suggest that people alter what criteria they say are relevant for a particular job according to the
characteristics of the person that they want to hire (Uhlmann and Cohen 2005; Luzadis et al. 2008). On
the inherent difficulties with neutrally assessing merit in specific domains, see Crosby et al. (2003), Kane
(1998), and Cicchetti (1994).
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physical fitness; core strength and endurance also have an important role. In the same
way, we might allow that the CRT tracks one aspect of rationality that women tend
to have less of than men, but without drawing any conclusions about overall levels of
rationality.
In our military fitness example, the important practical question is whether a certain
level of arm strength is required for success in the military. Analogously, the salient
question for us is whether the aspect of rationality potentially tracked by the CRT is
an essential element in good philosophising. There seem to be good reasons to think
that it is not, and rather, that the type of reflectivity tracked by the CRT is only one,
fairly minor skill utilised by philosophers. It might make for a good start to one’s
philosophical project to begin with sound thoughts that have already been subject to
some System 2 scrutiny, but it seems that the bulk of philosophical work comes later.
Consider how Livengood et al. set the scene for explaining the aspect of the philo-
sophical personality that they are interested in:
An intuition is a spontaneous intellectual sensation: p seems to be true without
being consciously inferred. In considering the first question of the CRT, for
example, it intuitively seems that the answer must be 10 cents. Similarly, in the
Gettier case, it intuitively seems that the agent does not have any knowledge…
(Livengood et al. 2010, p. 318)
There seems something odd about this analogy. In the CRT, intuition delivers the wrong
answer, and getting the right answer requires overriding intuition (rather than making
use of it). In the Gettier case, we have an intuition which then becomes the subject of
further philosophical exploration. By presenting thought experiments invoking certain
intuitions, Gettier’s (1963) paper far from closed the question of whether knowledge is
justified true belief. Rather, it was the starting point of an ongoing philosophical project.
Further philosophical work has consisted in: (i) suggesting additional conditions that
might be added in order to avoid Gettier cases, such as the ‘no false lemmas condition’
(e.g. Armstrong 1973, p. 152; Clark 1963), (ii) engaging in further thought experiments
to question the conditions for knowledge (e.g. Goldman’s (1976) ‘fake barn’ cases),
(iii) making distinctions within ‘justification’ and exploring what it takes for a belief to
be justified (e.g. Feldman and Conee 2001), and (iv) suggesting alternative accounts of
what constitutes knowledge, such as reliabilism (e.g. Nozick 1981). If it makes sense
to talk of ‘getting the right answer’ to a Gettier case, arriving at this ‘right answer’
when the case is first presented seems to be only a small and insignificant part of the
process, and it is not clear to what extent getting the answer wrong at the start would be
damaging to the long-term philosophical project.21 Philosophers have far more than
the few seconds or minutes spent on the CRT questions to properly evaluate Gettier
cases and come to a judgement on what knowledge really consists in. Thus although
there might be something in the reflectivity that is tested in the CRT, it seems like
there is another, broader type of reflectivity that is of more value and importance to
21 One way it could be damaging is if further reflection (or use of System 2 judgement) is used as a kind
of ‘press secretary’ for the initial intuition (or System 1 judgement), such that the philosophical project
consists in providing justifications for our initial, unconsidered judgements. On the idea of reason as a ‘press
secretary’ for our existing judgements, see van Mulukom (2018) and Haidt (2012).
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the long-term philosophical project—perhaps one involving an indefatigable pursuit
of answers, even where these are particularly hard to find.22
The above discussion has given just one reason to question the relative value of the
trait(s) tracked by the CRT compared to other traits that are potentially part of the ideal
philosophical personality. Given the precise nature of the CRT questions, set against
the range of virtues and skills that we might plausibly postulate as part of the ideal
philosophical personality, my view is that we probably need not hang too much on
whatever the CRT tracks. Not all philosophers perform well on the CRT and so it is,
at the least, possible to successfully progress in the field whilst lacking this particular
skill. And even if the trait that the CRT tracks contributes to good philosophising, it
is far from clear that this trait is essential to good philosophising and therefore to the
ideal philosophical personality in the sense of IPPN.
Moreover, it could be that there is a correlation between possessing above-average
levels of analyticity (or whatever we suppose it is that the CRT tracks) and lacking
other skills that are valued amongst philosophers, such as creativity. This is purely
speculative, but it is conceivable that a high CRT score comes at the expense of other
virtues that we need more of in Philosophy.23 Kahneman says that “absence of bias is
not always what matters most” (2011, p. 192), and this surely applies to Philosophy. It
could be that relief from the constraints of analyticity allows for more creative thinking,
increasing the likelihood of hitting upon unusual, divergent ideas. If this were true,
low CRT score should not be viewed as indicative of a poor philosopher.
Reflecting back on the military fitness example may be helpful here. Let us say that
(1) men have more arm strength than women, (2) military personnel have more arm
strength than those outside the military, (3) there are more men than women in the mil-
itary and (4) there is a good prima facie case for thinking that arm strength contributes
to doing your military service well. This state of affairs is perfectly consistent with
there being other attributes that contribute to success in the military that women have
more of than men (for example, endurance or emotional literacy). If this were the case,
in addition to checking that entry tests for the military are not overly-focused on arm
strength, it would also be important to look at how other factors such as discrimination
and unconscious bias might be contributing to the under-representation of women.
Applying the same reasoning to our case: Even if it is true that the trait T tracked by
the CRT is currently valued amongst philosophers (i.e. there is some truth to IPPD),
and even if possessing T does, as a matter of fact, make some contribution to good
philosophising (i.e. there is some truth to IPPN), it would still be wrong to think that
22 The ideas in this paragraph are heavily influenced by Emily Perry’s excellent response to this paper at
the London-Berkeley Graduate Conference 2018.
23 The idea that diversity amongst participants will benefit the discipline itself has been argued for in
relation to other disciplines, particularly Science (Rubin and O’Connor 2018; Harding 1991). Rubin and
O’Connor (2018) outline the potential benefits of diverse collaborations in Science, pointing to research by
Zollman (2010) suggesting that a diversity of beliefs within an epistemic community is key to ensuring that
the group eventually arrives at true beliefs. Moreover, Page (2008) and Phillips et al. (2006) have found that
a diversity of perspectives can aid complex problem-solving, as well as creative work. It seems plausible
that these arguments can be extended to Philosophy, in order to say that a diversity of philosophers may
positively influence the methodology, content, outcomes and practice of the discipline. For examples of this
kind of argument applied to Philosophy, see Wylie (2011). For criticisms of using this kind of argument to
justify affirmative action, see Anderson (2002).
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the empirical research entirely explains the gender gap in Philosophy. Since T is one
amongst many possible philosophical virtues and skills, women tending to exhibit less
of T should not be having such a dramatic effect as to produce the wide gender gap we
see in Philosophy. If that is not the case, and in fact it is a significant factor, because
possessing trait T is wrongly being prioritised as an important selection criterion, we
might speculate that this is detrimental to the discipline of Philosophy, since priori-
tisation of T might come at the expense of other valuable philosophical virtues and
skills. Regardless of the truth of this last hypothesis, the Inaction Conclusion would
be unjustified. Rather, as in the military case, we should turn a critical eye to entry
criteria, as well as onto whether there are other obstacles to women’s participation
such as discrimination and unconscious bias.
6.4 How should we understand the causal story?
Lastly, and importantly, we should note that the direction of causation has not been
established between CRT scores and philosophical training. We cannot say whether it
is philosophical training that leads to the increased CRT score amongst philosophers,
or whether possessing the trait(s) tracked by the CRT to a high degree leads people to
undergo more philosophical training.24
At least three possibilities explain the current data. Firstly, it may be that people with
higher CRT score are more likely to take up further philosophical training (Fig. 1).25
Since women tend to have lower CRT score, fewer women continue in Philosophy.
Secondly, it might be that the two facts are independent and we should draw no
conclusions from the gender gap in CRT score and the increased CRT score of philoso-
phers (Fig. 2).
However, given all that has been said so far, it seems unlikely that these facts
are entirely independent. Imagining our social awkwardness example to be true, we
would probably want to posit at least some causal relation between the phenomena.
For example, we might hypothesise that you need to be clever to be a philosopher and
being clever makes it harder to talk to other people. Analogously, there is likely to
be some causal story that can be told between the gender gap in CRT score and the
gender gap in Philosophy.
Thirdly, it could be that practising Philosophy brings up your CRT score, but fewer
women are continuing with Philosophy (for reasons unrelated to CRT score) (Fig. 3).
Women may be put off staying in Philosophy by contingent features of the discipline
in its present state, features that are amenable to change by the actions of university
faculties.26 If this were the case, it would be an injustice that we should actively seek
to rectify, for women would be missing out on opportunities to develop their capacities
in whatever it is that the CRT tracks.
24 Livengood et al. say that “our data do not tell us how philosophers came to be more reflective than their
peers” (2010, p. 319).
25 I borrow the terms ‘selectionist’ and ‘educationist’ from Livengood et al.’s (2010) discussion of the
causal relationship between philosophical training and cognitive reflectivity.
26 For discussion of potential ways that women are deterred from continuing in Philosophy and some
suggestions for interventions, see Demarest et al. (2017), Figdor and Drabek (2016), Saul (2013) and
Thompson et al. (2016).
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This third explanation denies both IPPD and IPPN, since it denies that the gender
gap in the CRT is explanatory for the gender gap in Philosophy. It says that although
the CRT may track a trait that is part of the philosophical personality, it is the study of
Philosophy that nurtures this trait, and so we must look elsewhere for explanations of
why women tend not to continue studying Philosophy beyond their tendency to have
a lower CRT score.
However, given the small number of participants in Philosophy, clearly the gender
gap in Philosophy cannot account for the gender gap in CRT score on its own. If the
hypothesis that the direction of causation runs this way is to be at all plausible, we
would need to speculate that Philosophy is one of a number of disciplines or activities
that improve CRT score and which men are more likely to engage in than women
(Fig. 4).
The causal story behind the gender gap in Philosophy is likely to be far more
complex than is allowed by any of the possibilities discussed so far. An intelligent
supporter of the Ideal Philosophical Personality Hypothesis would not claim that
the only cause of the gender gap in Philosophy is that women lack the aspect of
philosophical personality tracked by the CRT. A ‘perfect storm’ explanation of the
gender gap seems more plausible, where many factors combine to produce the dramatic
gender gap we see in Philosophy (Antony 2012). Figure 5 illustrates this with some
hypothetical (but plausible) examples of other causal factors.
The interesting question is then whether the tendency for women to exhibit less of
the trait(s) tracked by the CRT is one cause amongst many. Where a factor F is one
cause amongst several (mutually independent) causes, we should be able to vary the
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other causes without this leading to a change in F. And yet, it is not clear that this
would be the case here. For example, it seems plausible that were we to vary one of
the social norms that contribute to the gender gap in Philosophy, this would also lead
to a change in the CRT gender differential. In that case, this social norm would be a
common cause of both the CRT gender differential and the gender gap in Philosophy,
and the tendency for women to exhibit less of the trait(s) tracked by the CRT would
not be a mutually independent cause of the gender gap in Philosophy.
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To make this thought more concrete, we can take as an example the stereotype that
women are more intuitive and less logical. This stereotype might make women less
likely to imagine themselves as philosophers, with the consequence that they are less
likely to continue in the discipline (Demarest et al. 2017). In that case, this stereotype is
a causal factor in the gender gap in Philosophy. But the stereotype might also contribute
by a more indirect route. For example, the stereotype may have the effect that adults are
less likely to give girls toys that develop logic (Oksman 2016), with the consequence
that girls have fewer opportunities to develop skills at whatever the CRT tracks. In
that case, the stereotype acts as a causal factor in the CRT gender differential, which
then feeds into women appearing less likely to have the ‘philosophical personality’
and there being fewer women in Philosophy. The gender gap in Philosophy, as well as
the poorer performance of women on tasks like the CRT, would then provide further
evidence for the stereotype. So, the stereotype would be causing several environmental
interventions, which have effects that validate the stereotype (Fig. 6).27
Stories like this, where there is a kind of causal feedback loop operating between
different factors, seem plausible. To endorse this particular story would be to endorse
a version of the Ideal Philosophical Personality Hypothesis, since it allows that there
are fewer women in Philosophy partially as a result of women tending to lack an
aspect of the philosophical personality. But it is a story that points against the Inaction
Conclusion, because it blames women’s low CRT score not on innate differences in
aptitude, but on contingent structural norms and cultural practices that would lessen
27 The purpose of this diagram is to illustrate a possible causal feedback loop; it does not represent anything
like the true level of causal complexity. For example, the fact that women are potential child-bearers might
contribute to the stereotype that women are less logical, because being intuitive and ‘following your instincts’
is associated with pregnancy and childbirth. This stereotype might then feed into the lower expectations
that society has of girls, which then feeds into women’s lack of self-confidence.
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or disappear in a fairer, more equal society. An implication of this is that tackling the
structural injustice leading to the gender gap in CRT score would require far more
than simply making changes within the discipline of Philosophy.
Whatever we think of that story, it should at least be clear that a straightforward
causal arrow from CRT aptitude to the gender gap in Philosophy is highly implausible.
The causal story is likely to be far more complex than any of the initial hypotheses
allowed.
7 Conclusion
We have seen that there are several routes by which we can argue against the Quick
Conclusion. Firstly, we can dispute whether the CRT tracks what it is claimed it tracks.
Secondly, we can question whether the trait tracked by the CRT is something we should
value in philosophers. Thirdly, even if we allow that the CRT does track a valuable
trait, we can question how important this is when compared to all the other traits that
contribute to good philosophising. Lastly, we should question the implausibly simplis-
tic causal story that crude versions of the Ideal Philosophical Personality Hypothesis
imply.
The empirical research in this area is still in its infancy and there remain many
unanswered questions. It is unclear exactly what the CRT tracks, and the extent to
which whatever it tracks is currently selected for when recruiting philosophers onto
courses and into posts. It is therefore impossible to draw firm conclusions about the
truth of IPPD. However, if IPPD is true, it is only plausible to claim that the gender
gap in the CRT is somewhat explanatory for the gender gap in Philosophy. Women
exhibiting less of the trait tracked by the CRT will be one amongst many factors,
and it is likely that there will be a number of interaction effects between these causal
factors, resulting in a complex causal story where causal connections run in multiple
directions.
A plausible case can be mounted against IPPN, particularly when we think about
the range of philosophical virtues and skills that plausibly might constitute the ideal
form of the philosophical personality. This, however, is a matter for debate; there
is, at the least, a prima facie case for thinking that the skill tracked by the CRT has
at least some value for good philosophising (though this may be offset if it comes
at the expense of other, valuable traits). What we can say with confidence is that
the interpretation of the empirical research which says that there are fewer women
in Philosophy because women naturally lack the personalities required to be good
philosophers is unconvincing.
Rather than endorsing one particular response, the intention of this paper is to open
up discussion of how best to make sense of the research as it currently stands, and to
prompt reflection on what practical responses are appropriate in light of the different
hypotheses. For example, if it is right that poor CRT performance is an indicator of low
confidence, then this would add urgency to the already growing cries for finding ways
to increase self-confidence amongst women. Even simple interventions, such as giving
more explicit encouragement to undergraduates (Saul 2013, p. 51) or emphasising the
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importance of effort rather than ‘brilliance’ (Thompson et al. 2016), might partially
stem the flow out of Philosophy’s leaky pipeline.28
Although not all the routes discussed have dismissed the part of the Quick Con-
clusion that claims that the gender gap in the CRT is explanatory for the gender gap
in Philosophy, all routes imply that it would be the wrong response to the empiri-
cal findings for Philosophy departments to simply relax and take no action aimed at
narrowing the gender gap in Philosophy. Instead, the discussion points towards the
view that making relevant structural changes to the environment (both inside and out-
side of Philosophy) should remain our focus when thinking about the gender gap in
Philosophy.
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